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The existence of enormous differences in the levels of productivity and factor accumulation 
across countries constitutes one of the most perplexing issues in economics. Many 
explanations have been offered for the large disparities, including the initial level of capital 
stocks (physical, natural and human), human capital externalities, macroeconomic stability, 
quality of institutions, geography, trade openness and rules over foreign investment. 
Increasingly, economists are exploring the ways that public and civic institutions, social 
mores and norms of behavior, and social networks influence economic activity. Such analysis 
recognizes that economic growth goes beyond factor accumulation and is linked to another 
economic dimension that some have labeled social capital.  
We model the effects of social networks, specifically social barriers to communication, on 
total factor productivity (TFP) and (human or reproducible) capital accumulation. In a 
dynamic model we show that social barriers to communication inhibit linkages that both 
create and diffuse productivity-enhancing knowledge. We subsequently test the model’s 
propositions using cross-country data to determine whether social differences that hinder 
communication, such as linguistic diversity, have a negative impact on the level of TFP and 
factor accumulation. 
Our approach is consistent with a number of important stylized facts at an economy-wide 
level and emphasizes the importance of initial conditions in terms of social barriers to 
communication. In particular, our paper helps explain the importance and persistence of 
differences in cross-country TFP, the existence of country growth laggards and leaders, and 
also provides policy implications in terms of cross-country productivity ‘catch up’. 
The paper is organized as follows. The following section solves a dynamic optimization 
model of social networks with barriers to communication and analyzes the implications for 
TFP and factor accumulation. Section II describes the data and the empirical model used to 
test the theoretical propositions. Section III reports the empirical results. The economic 
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implications of impediments to communication across social networks are examined in 
section IV. Concluding remarks are offered in section V. 
 
I. Economic Modeling of Social Networks 
 
Our modeling of social networks is novel, but we owe a debt to those who have tested for the 
interaction between economic performance and various characterizations of social capital, 
social infrastructure or social capability (William Easterly and Ross Levine, 1997; Robert E. 
Hall and Charles I. Jones, 1999; John F. Helliwell and Robert D. Putnam, 1995; Stephen 
Knack and Phillip Keefer, 1997; Jonathan Temple and Paul A. Johnson, 1998; Paul J. Zak 
and Knack, 2001). Our work has similarities to contributions by Edward P. Lazear (1999), 
Daniel Nettle (2000) and James E. Rauch (2001) that emphasize the importance of linguistic 
and cultural diversity for, respectively, exchange and trade between individuals, aggregate 
per capita GDP and international trade. Roland Bénabou (1996) also stresses the importance 
of heterogeneity, especially with respect to inequality and school funding, while Mark 
Gradstein and Moshe Justman (2002) present a related concept called social polarization. We 
explore the wider implications of what others have identified as social or cultural differences 
and the effects of social relations on economic outcomes (Brian Uzzi, 1996). In particular, we 
develop a dynamic model of social networks and use it to provide empirical tests of the 
effects of social barriers to communication on cross-country differences in productivity and 
factor accumulation.  
The model we develop incorporates three key ideas. One, cooperation and group 
interactions enable economies to use large amounts of specialized knowledge (Gary S. 
Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, 1992; Robert E. Lucas Jr., 1988; Luis A. Rivera-Batiz and 
Paul M. Romer, 1991). Two, although knowledge is inherently nonrival, the creation and 
transfer of tacit knowledge or ‘know-how’ is highly dependent on communication links both 
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within social networks (John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, 2000; James S. Coleman, Elihu 
Katz and Herbert Menzel, 1966; Alfred Marshall, 1916; Walter W. Powell, 1990; Bryce Ryan 
and Neal C. Gross, 1943; Annalee Saxenian, 1994) and by ‘weak ties’ (Mark S. Granovetter, 
1973) across social networks (Everett M. Rogers, 1995; Thomas W. Valente, 1995). Three, 
individuals communicate more easily the greater the similarity between them (Gabriel Tarde, 
1895; Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, 1954), and communication and cooperation 
across social networks is often much more limited than within networks (Bénabou, 1996; 
George J. Borjas, 1992 and 1995; Ronald S. Burt, 2002; James A. Davis, 1967; Thomas W. 
Schelling, 1978; Muzafer Sherif, O.J. Harvey, B. Jack White, William R. Hood and Carolyn 
W. Sherif, 1961; Robert A. Solo, 1967).  
We posit that economy-wide output is increasing in the level of a reproducible capital 
stock (physical or human), the level of effort devoted to production and the number of 
communication links between social networks. Communication links help in the creation of 
productivity-enhancing ideas and also in the transmission of tacit knowledge that raises 
economy-wide productivity. Differences across social groups make communication and 
interaction worthwhile via ‘cross-fertilization’ of knowledge and ideas — complementary 
knowledge — but social barriers that inhibit communication or interchange (such as linguistic 
differences) raise the cost of mutually beneficial and productivity-enhancing 
communications. 
To capture the effects of social barriers to communication we assume that a 
representative agent’s utility function depends positively on per capita consumption at time t, 
c(t), and negatively on the effort required to establish social connections across social 
networks, s(t), where the latter variable has a lower bound of zero, i.e., 
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 where θ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (assumed to lie between zero and one), 
z  is an effort or communication disutility coefficient that is greater than one, ρ  is the rate of 
time preference and β  is an economy-wide parameter that affects the ease of establishing 
social networks. 
Factors that reduce social barriers to communication, such as a common national school 
curriculum or a common language, may be interpreted as a shift in the value of β .  The β  
parameter is taken to be sufficiently positive to ensure that U c  is jointly concave and is 
bounded from above by the assumption that, even in the absence of social barriers, 
communication costs between individuals are always positive.  
( , )s
Equation (1) is consistent with an intertemporal consumption/leisure model of individual 
preferences, and the negative effect of s(t) on utility incorporates the notion that the time 
involved in making connections across social networks is privately costly. It follows that an 
increase in the policy parameter β  (a policy change that makes it easier for agents to form 
social connections) lowers the ‘utility-cost’ of forming connections.  
To complete the model, aggregate output is determined by 
 
(2) 1 20( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )Y t s t N t K t
α αα=  
 
where 0α  is economy-wide productivity, N(t) is the size of the labor force, S(t)N(t) is 
effective units of labor where the productivity of labor is increasing in the number of 
economy-wide connections across social networks, K(t) is the reproducible capital stock 
(physical or human) and, for convenience, we assume constant returns to scale although this 
is not essential to derive our results.  
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In per capita form, and suppressing t, the economy’s aggregate production function is 
given by 
 
(3) 1 20y s k
α αα=  
 
where  and . The change in the reproducible capital stock with respect to 
time is governed by 
/y Y N= /k K N=
 
(4) k y c= −&  
 
To solve the optimization problem we maximize (1) subject to (4), the initial condition 
 and the necessary feasibility constraints. We note that c and s are both control 
variables, and define 
0(0)k = k
λ  as the co-state variable.  
Along the optimal path, both (4) and the following necessary conditions must be satisfied 
for all t: 
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The first-order conditions imply that 
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Thus a policy increase in β , which reduces the barriers to communication, results in an 
increase in social connections across networks. Equation (8), along with the necessary 
conditions, can be used to derive the following transition paths:  
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At the steady state, per-capita consumption ( c∗ ) is a function of the steady-state reproducible 
capital ( k ) and is expressed as follows, ∗
 
(11) 
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Thus the steady-state values for consumption and reproducible capital are, 
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These results yield the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: The transition paths and the steady-state values of c and  are 
increasing in the policy parameter β that reduces the social barriers to communication.  
* *k
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It follows immediately that, if , which is required for convexity in the effort-
disutility relationship, and 0 < 
1z >
θ  < 1, Proposition 1 holds true.  
The intuition for the results is that increases in β, or lowering the costs of forming 
connections across social networks, increases the network-augmented rate of return given in 
the first term of the brackets of equation (9). In turn, this induces the accumulation of 
reproducible capital and raises the steady-state values of consumption and capital.  
Finally, expressing equation (8) as a function of  and substituting into (2) yields a 
closed-form solution for aggregate output: 
*k
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Equation (15) yields the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Increases in the policy parameter β  reduce the social barriers to 
communication and raise economy-wide total factor productivity, A. 
 
Our results can be tested using cross-country data and measures of TFP, social barriers to 
communication and other variables that may reduce communication costs. In testing the 
propositions, it should be emphasized that the policy parameter β  affects TFP and transitory 
and steady state levels of consumption and reproducible capital. Given that the number of 
social connections across social networks cannot be quantified at a national level, β  proxies 
social factors or variables that are both measurable and influence the number and quality of 
connections across social networks. 
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 II. Tests of the Propositions 
 
To test Proposition 2 we estimate a model where the regressand is a measure of TFP. The 
regressors include proxies for β  and are consistent with a rich literature that shows people 
socialize with persons with similar characteristics (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954). We also 
include as regressors factors that might mitigate the effects of social barriers to 
communication on productivity, such as the level of social infrastructure, trade openness, 
measures of mass communications and population density. 
The chosen measure for TFP comes from Hall and Jones (1999) and is solved as a labor-
augmenting measure of productivity from the following output per worker production 
function: 
 
(16)   iiiii AhYKy
)1/()/( αα −=
 
where  is output per worker, Y  is total output,  is the physical capital stock, and  is 
human capital per worker in country i.  Human capital per worker is defined as e  where 
 is the years of schooling and the function 
iy i iK
( )iE
ih
( )iEφ
iE φ  is the relative efficiency of labor in 
country i with  years of schooling. Given data on  and  for 1988, assuming iE , ,i iy K Li iE
( )φ ⋅ is piecewise linear and a value of α  equal to one third, Hall and Jones solve for values of 
 for 127 countries, which hereafter we denote lnTFP.ln iA
1 
Equation (16) is not identical to (3) or (14), but it does provide a measure of the 
unexplained differences in cross-national economic performance after accounting for changes 
in labor and both physical and human capital. Thus if social barriers to communication do 
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affect productivity, as predicted by proposition 2, we would expect the proxies for β  to be 
statistically significant in a regression where lnTFP is the regressand.  
Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain 
Wacziarg (2003) is the source of data on three potentially important measures of social 
barriers to communication based on linguistic, ethnic and religious fractionalization. Their 
measures are calculated as follows: 
 
(17) 21
n
i k
k
FRAC f= − i∑  
 
where kif  is the share of (linguistic, ethnic or religious) group k in country i. Using data from 
the Encyclopedia Britannica (2000), with other sources used for cross-checking, they 
calculate their measures of ethnic (Ethnic), linguistic (Language) and religious (Religion) 
fractionalization for up to 215 countries.  We also use James D. Fearon’s (2003) cultural 
fractionalization measure, which is based on the structural distance between languages. 
These fractionalization indexes do not directly measure the quality or quantity of 
communication between social groups, but do reflect the number and relative sizes of distinct 
social groups within a country. Cross-country summary statistics of the fractionalization 
measures and other key variables are provided in Table 1. 
Proposition 1 implies that the higher is the initial level of social barriers to 
communication, the lower will be the transitory and steady-state levels of reproducible capital 
(physical or human). We test this proposition by estimating the following equations:  
 
(18) iiiii RGDPWAYSFRACAYS µδδδδ ++++=∆ 60ln60 3210  
 
(19) iiiii RGDPWKAPWFRACKAPW νγγγγ ++++=∆ 60ln65lnln 3210  
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where ∆AYS is the change in Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee’s (2001) measure of the 
average years of schooling in the total population aged 15 years and over between 1960 and 
1999, ∆lnKAPW is the change in the natural log of real physical capital stock per worker 
between 1965 and 1990 (from the Penn World Tables) and subscript i denotes observations 
for country i. For FRAC, as well as the measures constructed by Alesina et al. and Fearon, we 
also use an ethnolinguistic fractionalization index for 1960, ELF, obtained from Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1999).  The sources 
for Alesina et al.’s fractionalization measures are mainly from the early to mid 1990s 
although they argue that they will display considerable time persistence. ELF provides a 
base-period index to assess the sensitivity of the results to the timing of the FRAC measure. 
AYS60 and lnKAPW65 are base-period values for the respective capital stock proxies. 
lnRGDPW60 is (the natural log of) real gross domestic product per worker in international 
prices in 1960. The appended error terms, µi and νi, are country specific and assumed to be 
independently and normally distributed. Consistency with Proposition 1 requires that the 
estimated coefficient on the fractionalization measure be negative and statistically significant. 
To test whether social barriers to communication have a negative effect on TFP, as 
predicted, we estimate variants of the following reduced-form model.  
 
(20) 0 1 2 3ln e  i iTFP Ethnic Language R ligion Controli iπ π π π ψ= + + + + + ε  
 
where TFP is the Hall-Jones proxy for TFP and iε is the country-specific error term. The term 
ψ  is a vector of parameters to be estimated and Control is a vector of regressors to control 
for variables such as institutional quality, trade openness and measures of mass 
communication that may influence TFP. Proposition 2 implies that the estimated coefficients 
for at least some of the fractionalization regressors be negative and statistically significant. 
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III. Empirical Results 
 
The tests for proposition 1 and 2 are presented separately because they require different 
data. Our primary focus is on the effects of social barriers to communication, proxied by 
fractionalization measures, on productivity because we hypothesize that it is links across 
networks that make labor more effective, which, in turn, induces factor accumulation.  
 
A. Factor Accumulation 
 
Table 2 provides the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of (18) and (19) that test 
Proposition 1 using alternative fractionalization indexes to proxy the effects of social barriers 
to communication. The reported diagnostics include Jurgen A. Doornik and Henrik Hansen’s 
(1994) χ2 test for normality of the errors (denoted Normality) and an F-form of an asymptotic 
test for heteroskedasticity (denoted White-Hetero) based on regressing the squared residuals 
on the original regressors and their (non-redundant) squares (Halbert White, 1980). For two 
of the models estimated for ∆lnKAPW the heteroskedasticity test (in columns (5) and (6)) is 
statistically significant; however, the use of heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors has 
little effect on the statistical significance of the coefficients.  
In all models, the relevant base-period capital stock measure has a significant negative 
coefficient at the 5-percent level of significance, or better. Base-period real per capita GDP 
has a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 10-percent level for the model 
in column (3) and at the 5-percent level or better in the other models. When the set of three 
Alesina et al. measures is included, ethnic, but not linguistic or religious, fractionalization has 
a statistically significant negative coefficient at the 5-percent level in both the ∆AYS and 
∆lnKAPW equations. Fearon’s fractionalization index, Culture, has a negative coefficient that 
is statistically significant in the human capital equation at the 5-percent level, and ELF has a 
 11
significant negative coefficient at the 1-percent level of significance in both the human 
capital and physical capital equations. Although measurement of human and physical capital 
stocks is problematical, these results do support the hypothesis that the initial level of social 
barriers to communication reduces capital accumulation.  
 
B. Total Factor Productivity: OLS Results 
 
Table 3 provides OLS estimates of variants of equation (20) that tests Proposition 2.  In 
column (1), which includes only the fractionalization measures and no control regressors, the 
coefficients on Ethnic and Language have the predicted negative signs and are both 
statistically significant at the 5-percent level.  
In addition to the fractionalization measures, other factors are also likely to influence 
TFP. Consequently, column (2) gives the results of a model that includes, separately, the two 
components of Hall and Jones’ (1999) social infrastructure index. The two components are 
GADP, an index of government antidiversion policies, which incorporates equally-weighted 
measures of law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation and 
government repudiation of contracts, and YrsOpen, an index of the extent to which countries 
are open to international trade.2  In the model in column (2), the coefficient on Ethnic is no 
longer statistically significant, but the results for Language are robust to the addition of these 
controls.  Given our hypotheses about the nature of the transmission of productivity-
enhancing ideas, we would expect linguistic differences to be the most important barriers to 
communication across networks.  
Diagnostic tests suggest the presence of heteroskedasticity (with the White-Hetero test 
statistically significant at the 5-percent level for the models in columns (2), (3) and (4)). 
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are also reported, although these give qualitatively 
similar results to the conventional standard errors.  
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Given the hypothesized importance of linguistic barriers, we re-estimated the initial 
model, but included only a measure of linguistic differences (Fearon’s fractionalization 
index, Culture) along with the controls GADP and YrsOpen. Column (3) reports these results; 
the coefficient on Fearon’s index is negative, as predicted, and statistically significant at the 
5-percent level.   
The results in columns (4) to (6) provide further evidence on the robustness of the initial 
results.  Studentized residuals and leverage statistics were calculated for the model in column 
(2) in order to identify potential outliers and/or influential observations.3 Column (4) presents 
the results from re-estimating the model with the observations identified by the above 
statistics removed from the sample, in order to check the sensitivity of the results to the 
omission of outliers and/or influential observations.  While the overall goodness of fit 
improves and the coefficient on Language increases in absolute size, the results are 
qualitatively unchanged.   
To test whether the effects of fractionalization vary between rich and poor countries, we 
also re-estimated the model in column (2) excluding OECD countries; these results are given 
in column (5) and are very similar to those in columns (2) and (4). As a further check on the 
sensitivity of the results, column (6) provides estimates using an alternative estimate for the 
logarithm of TFP derived by Nazrul Islam (1995). As predicted by Proposition 2, the 
coefficient for Language is negative and statistically significant at the 5-percent level 
throughout. 
 
C. Total Factor Productivity: Robustness Results 
 
As a check on the robustness of the results in Table 1, we applied a general-to-specific 
(Gets) algorithm implemented in PcGets (David Hendry and Hans-Martin Krolzig, 2001) to 
select a preferred model for TFP.4 The essence of Gets modelling is to start from a general 
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unrestricted model that is ‘congruent’ with the data, i.e., displays no evidence of 
misspecification.  Variables with coefficients that are not statistically significant are 
eliminated so to obtain a simpler congruent model that encompasses rival models in the sense 
that no important information is lost (e.g., Hendry, 1995, p. 365).  The basic Gets approach 
has been significantly enhanced by recent developments by Hendry and Krolzig (1999) and 
Krolzig and Hendry (2001).  These include: examining multiple search paths, considering 
only model reductions that do not fail diagnostic tests in order to retain congruence, 
employing ‘pre-search simplification’, using overlapping sub-sample testing to aid in the 
overall assessment of the ‘reliability’ of the significance of the coefficients, implementing 
encompassing tests to distinguish between competing candidate congruent models that 
emerge from different search paths, and using an information criterion to make a final 
selection if encompassing tests fail to pick a unique dominant final model.5  
Monte Carlo evidence to date (e.g., Krolzig and Hendry, 2001; Hendry and Krolzig, 
2001) suggests that the different elements of the overall algorithm combine to give 
impressive properties: the size of the model selection process is close to the nominal size of 
the tests used in the search such that the power approaches that obtained if the process started 
from the data generating process.6  In particular, Kevin D. Hoover and Stephen J. Perez 
(2001), in a Monte Carlo study designed to reflect the ‘realistic’ setting of cross-country 
growth regressions, show that a cross-section version of a Gets algorithm outperforms Ross 
Levine and David Renelt’s (1992) and Xavier X. Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) versions of Edward 
E. Leamer’s (1983) extreme-bounds approach to model selection.7 
Table 4, column (1) reports results for the model specified in equation (20) where, in 
addition to GADP and YrsOpen, the control variables include measures of mass 
communication, population density and interaction effects. Given that social barriers to 
communication impede the exchange of productivity-enhancing ideas, we hypothesize that 
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physical infrastructure that aids in communications may mitigate the negative impact on TFP. 
We also test whether increased proximity between people, as measured by population density 
(Popn Density) and road density (Road Density), reduces the effect of social communication 
barriers. Interaction effects are included to test the hypothesis that increases in mass 
communications or population density reduce the negative partial effect of linguistic 
fractionalization on TFP. Due to the heavily parameterized nature of the model given in 
column (1) of Table 4, it is not surprising that few of the individual coefficients are 
statistically significant at conventional levels.8  Nevertheless, we use this initial model as a 
starting point for the application of a general-to-specific simplification process. 
The results in column (2) of Table 4 are the final specific model selected using the 
general-to-specific model selection algorithm applied to the model in column (1), Table 4.  
Two measures of social barriers to communication, Language and Religion, are selected and 
have coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1-percent level and have the 
hypothesized negative sign. One of the measures of mass communications, the number of 
telephones per capita (Telephones) has a coefficient with the hypothesized positive sign that 
is also statistically significant at the 1-percent level.  Another mass communication measure 
is included in the selected interaction term Language*Radios.  Its coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5-percent level, implying that the negative effects of linguistic 
fractionalization are reduced with improvements in mass communication, proxied by the 
number of radios per capita. 
Further robustness tests are provided in columns (3) and (4) in Table 4. Column (3) 
contains median regression (least absolute errors) estimates for the final selected model to 
assess the robustness of the results to potential outliers.  Point estimates and standard errors 
based on the design-matrix-bootstrapping estimator (Moshe Buchinsky, 1998) produce 
qualitatively similar conclusions to column (2) with the estimated coefficients for linguistic 
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and religious diversity both negative and statistically significant at the 1-percent level. 
Column (4) presents the results of the final model selected from a general-to-specific search 
applied to a model of the form in column (1) of Table 4, except that Fearon’s Culture index 
replaces the three Alesina et al. (2003) measures and the Language variable in the interaction 
terms.  Again, the linguistic diversity measure (Culture) is selected in the final model and has 
a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5-percent level.  In addition, both 
the trade openness measure and telephones per capita are also selected in the final model.  
Overall, the robustness tests indicate that the estimated coefficients for the linguistic 
fractionalization measures, which proxy social barriers to communication, have a negative 
and statistically significant on TFP. Thus the results are consistent with the proposition that 
social barriers to communication have a negative impact on productivity. 
 
D. Total Factor Productivity: IV Results 
 
A possible concern with the estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4 is that, while it may be 
reasonable to treat the fractionalization measures as exogenous, as do Alesina et al. (2003), 
several of the controlling variables may be endogenous. If this is the case, then OLS 
estimates will be inconsistent. To address this issue, we use instrumental variables that should 
be uncorrelated with iε , but strongly correlated with the potentially endogenous variables.   
Table 5 presents results obtained using instrumental variables (IV) estimation in which all 
variables other than the fractionalization measures are treated as potentially endogenous.  We 
follow Hall and Jones (1999) in including Jeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer’s (1999) 
(natural log) predicted trade share (based on a trade model including exogenous gravity 
variables), lnFraRom, and the fraction of the population speaking a European language, 
EurFrac, in the instrument set.  Hall and Jones also use distance from the equator as an 
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instrument, but, following Jeffrey D. Sachs’s (2003) argument that this is a poor proxy for 
geographical factors such as climate, we instead use mean annual temperature, MeanTemp, 
which provides better fits for the first-stage regressions, as well as the proportion of land area 
within 100km of the coast, LT100km, and total land area, LandArea.  In addition, we include 
a measure of ‘state antiquity’, StateHist, constructed by Valerie Bockstette, Areendam 
Chanda and Louis Putterman (2002), which their empirical results suggest is a significant 
predictor of Hall and Jones’ composite social infrastructure measure.9 We also include the 
interactions between linguistic fractionalization and a subset of the geographical instruments 
in some of the instrument sets to allow for the endogeneity of interaction terms involving 
fractionalization and the other right-hand-side variables, such as Language×Radios. 
Table 5 provides evidence on the suitability of the sets of instruments used.  To check on 
the explanatory power of the instrument sets, the values of R2 for the first-stage regressions of 
each right-hand-side endogenous variable on the instruments, including a constant, were 
calculated.  We also calculated p-values of the F-statistics for the joint null hypothesis that 
the coefficients on all the instruments (including the exogenous regressors) are zero; these are 
not reported in Table 5 because they are all 0.000. These p-values, reflecting the high R2 
values, indicate that the instrument sets are strongly associated with the endogenous right-
hand-side variables.  To check on the correlation between the residuals and the instruments 
we calculated J. Denis Sargan’s (1964) general misspecification test for instrumental 
variables estimation of over-identified models.  The test statistic, denoted Sargan χ2 in Table 
5, is obtained as NR2 from the regression of the IV residuals on the set of all instruments and 
is asymptotically distributed as a central chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of over-identifying restrictions.  The hypothesis that the over-identifying instruments 
are independent of the error terms is not rejected for any of the models.  We also report a 
Hausman test of the consistency of the OLS estimates by comparison with IV based on the 
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selected instrument set(s); under the null that the OLS estimates are consistent, the test is 
asymptotically distributed as a central chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of potentially endogenous right-hand-side variables.  The results imply that OLS 
estimates are not significantly affected by endogeneity for the models in columns (1) and (3) 
of Table 5, but are inconsistent when compared to the IV estimates in column (5), using a 5-
percent significance level, and more marginally, at the 10-percent significance level, for 
columns (2) and (4). 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 report the IV estimation results for the models 
corresponding to the OLS estimates in column (2) and (3) in Table 3. Again, both sets of 
results are consistent with the prediction that linguistic diversity has a negative impact on 
TFP. The results presented in column (3) in Table 5 correspond to the model estimated in 
column (2) of Table 4, i.e., including those variables retained in the final model from the 
OLS-based general-to-specific selection process. Apart from a reduction in the statistical 
significance of the coefficient on Telephones, the IV results are very similar to those obtained 
using OLS, an interpretation supported by the non-rejection of the Hausman Test. Column (4) 
in Table 5 is the final model obtained by commencing with the general model in Table 4, 
column (1) and applying the general-to-specific simplification, but based throughout on IV 
estimation, using the specified instrument set, rather than OLS.  One component of Hall and 
Jones’ social infrastructure proxy, YrsOpen, and Road Density are selected, in place of 
Telephones, but linguistic and religious fractionalization continue to have a significant 
negative effect. In addition, the role of communications, proxied by Radios, in reducing the 
effect of linguistic fractionalization remains significant through the interaction term. Finally, 
to illustrate the robustness of the results for the fractionalization and communications 
variables to the inclusion of social infrastructure proxies, column (5) of Table 5 reports the 
results obtained by again applying the general-to-specific simplification based on IV 
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estimation commencing from a general model excluding GADP and YrsOpen. The variables 
selected are, apart from the excluded YrsOpen variable, identical to those in column (4), 
reinforcing the robustness of these results.  
 
E. Economic Significance of Total Factor Productivity Results 
 
To assess the economic significance of the effect of social barriers to communication, we 
carried out a simple simulation. Taking the results from Table 4, column (2) as 
representative, the coefficients, which being statistically significant at the 5-percent level or 
better are all relatively precisely estimated, were used to predict the values of lnTFP for each 
country and these were transformed into levels. The 110 countries in the sample were then 
sorted in ascending order on the basis of their values for Language.  The means of the 
predicted values of TFP in levels for the lower and upper quartile countries (defined as the 
bottom 27 and top 27 countries in terms of the ranking with respect to Language) were then 
calculated.  The ratio of the mean predicted TFP values for the quartile with the lowest 
measure of linguistic fractionalization, relative to the mean predicted TFP values for the 
quartile with the highest measure of linguistic fractionalization, is greater than two (2.293). 
This implies that the effects of social barriers to communication are economically as well as 
statistically significant in explaining cross-country variation in TFP levels. 
Overall, the results provide support for propositions 1 and 2. Together with other 
explanatory factors, our results provide a plausible explanation for the large disparity in 
productivity across countries, and why these differences may not necessarily decline over 
time.  
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IV. Economic Implications of Social Networks 
 
Our model emphasizes the social dimension of cross-country economic differences rather 
than simply differences in levels of capital (human and physical). It also explains or supports 
a number of important stylized facts at an economy-wide level, and thus goes further than the 
existing literature on social cohesion and polarization (Bénabou, 1996; Gradstein and 
Justman, 2002). Indeed, our approach provides a partial explanation for the large differences 
in total factor productivity, and thus income, across countries (Easterly and Levine, 2001). 
Our results address three key features of economic performance. One, the on-going high 
performance of leading industrialized countries; two, the ability of a few countries to initiate 
‘catch up’ with economic leaders; and three, the reason why some countries remain growth 
laggards (Lant Pritchett, 1997). To the extent that increased connections contribute to higher 
levels of trust and cooperation between individuals, our results also provide a possible 
explanation for the positive empirical relationship between social capital and human capital 
accumulation (Edward L. Glaeser, David Laibson and Bruce Sacerdote, 2002).  
 
A. High Productivity Performance 
 
We emphasize that diversity, per se, is not detrimental to productivity because it is 
diversity that provides the basis for mutually beneficial exchanges and the ‘cross-
fertilization’ of knowledge and ideas — a point made by John Stuart Mill (1848, p. 594) over 
150 years ago. Rather, it is the associated higher costs of and barriers to group-to-group 
communication that act as an impediment to increases in productivity and factor 
accumulation that diversity would otherwise bring. Indeed, radial, spanning or bridging 
connections across networks, on an individual level, are strongly associated with early 
adoption of technologies (Valente, 1995, p. 42). Our results support this finding on a national 
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level with evidence that factors that inhibit radial links across social networks, such as 
linguistic barriers, lower economy-wide productivity. 
We speculate that social barriers to communication may, in part, explain the high 
productivity of the United States (US) that has a common language and is also a 
multicultural, pluralistic and geographically and socially mobile society (Borjas, 1992). In 
other words, countries like the US that have a common language and a unifying culture can 
reap the benefits from complementary knowledge sets inherent in different social and 
professional networks. Our thesis is also supported by recent empirical evidence that uses 
data from US cities and finds that, after controlling for endogeneity, the greater is the cultural 
diversity, the more productive are US-born citizens (Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni 
Peri, 2004). By contrast, countries that are less socially diverse and mobile than the US, or 
that are diverse but have major impediments (social, physical and institutional) to group-to-
group communications, may suffer from a lower level of productivity because they have less 
effective radial links across social networks.  
 
B. Productivity ‘catch up’ 
 
The social networks perspective offers insights as to how countries might engineer a 
‘catch up’ in terms of productivity by fostering approaches that mitigate barriers to 
communication across social groups. For example, the offering of common national curricula 
that engender a shared identity and heritage and reduce social distance (Gradstein and 
Justman, 2002), citizenship and native language classes for immigrants, a common and 
actively promoted official language, investments in mass communications such as internet 
access and communication links, are all approaches that may generate a substantial pay-off in 
productivity by reducing the costs of communication across social networks.  
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To some extent, such measures have been adopted to varying degrees by countries, but 
usually without a proper recognition of their economic benefits for both productivity and 
factor accumulation. In sum, national policies can positively influence economic growth if 
they lower social communication costs that impede the creation and diffusion of productivity 
enhancing ideas. 
 
C. Stylized facts 
 
We have explored the concept and consequences of social barriers to communication 
across networks at an economy level, but the idea is also consistent with a number of 
important stylized facts at a regional and global level. For instance, Lazear (1999), Rauch 
(2001), Rauch and Vitor Trindade (2002), and others, have identified the importance of 
networks and a common language in trade, but their explanation is that networks alleviate the 
difficulties of enforcing contracts, provide information on trade opportunities and help match 
buyers and sellers. Our work emphasizes the importance of trade and migration flows in the 
transmission of ideas whereby connections across networks provide a basis for productivity 
gains.  
Our model has parallels to network theory where key agents (individuals or groups of 
individuals) that link across networks provide the means of knowledge transmission within a 
network via positive interactions (Durlauf, 1997) and by acting as role models (Rogers, 
1995). Our thesis that economy-wide productivity is affected by connections across social 
networks also has empirical support — Jungsoo Park (2004) finds, using OECD data on 
cross-country student flows, that the return of foreign-educated workers is an empirically 
important channel for research and development spillovers. An example of such a spillover is 
reported by Easterly (2002, pp.145-148); he describes how a single individual played a lead 
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role in developing the garment industry in Bangladesh following the transfer of tacit 
knowledge via South Korea.  
At a local or regional level a number of distinguished thinkers, including Schelling (1978) 
and Tarde (1895), have observed the tendency for ‘like-with-like’ interactions, known as 
homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954, p. 23). This is consistent with our model where 
establishing links across social networks is costly. Locations where people ‘connect’ also 
exemplify low social barriers to communication (or a high β ) that promote knowledge 
transfer and innovation. These localized effects have been measured in the creation of 
localized spillovers in the household adoption of information technology via social networks 
(Austan Goolsbee and Peter J. Klenow, 2002). The positive effects of localized social 
networks have also been observed in spatial patterns of patents (Adam B. Jaffe, Manuel 
Trajtenberg and Rebecca Henderson, 1993; Laura Bottazzi and Giovanni Peri, 2003) and help 
to explain the higher rents and wages (Rauch, 1993) found in knowledge ‘hot spots’.  
The existence of positive economic payoffs from connecting across social networks is 
supported by evidence that cities and social interactions promote the accumulation of human 
capital (Borjas, 1995; Glaeser and David C. Maré, 2001; Lucas, 1988; Marshall, 1916, p. 
271). Our result of a network-augmented rate of return for capital (human or physical) in 
locations where people ‘connect’ is also consistent with the stylised fact that factors of 
production agglomerate and provides an explanation as to why capital might flow from poor 
to rich countries (Lucas, 1990). 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper addresses the question: what explains the huge variation in productivity across 
countries? Using an optimal growth model, social barriers to communication are shown to 
have a negative effect on both productivity and the accumulation of reproducible capital. The 
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model generates important and testable propositions: a policy parameter that reduces the 
barriers to communication across social networks raises economy-wide productivity, and also 
increases transitional and steady-state levels of per-capita consumption and the reproducible 
capital stock.  
Propositions from the model are tested using cross-country data from over a 100 
countries. The results obtained from OLS and instrumental variable estimation, and with an 
exhaustive set of robustness tests, are both statistically and economically significant and 
support the hypothesis that social barriers to communication, as measured by linguistic 
diversity, reduce total factor productivity. Some evidence is also found to support the idea 
that the effects of social barriers to communication may be mitigated by improvements in 
mass communications. In addition, changes in the stocks of human capital and physical 
capital are shown to be decreasing in social barriers to communication, after controlling for 
the initial level of income and capital stock.  
Our results are broadly consistent with a number of important stylized facts including the 
importance of social networks in research and development spillovers, the creation of 
localized spillovers in technology adoption and the flow of capital to locations where people 
‘connect’. The theory and empirical evidence together provide an important and novel 
explanation for the large cross-country differences in total factor productivity, the high 
productivity performance of leading industrialized countries such as the United States and the 
ability of some countries to initiate productivity ‘catch up’.   
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APPENDIX A: COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN SAMPLE 
The following countries are included in the sample for the regressions in Table 4, 
columns (1) to (3): Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, 
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, 
Gabon, The Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, South Korea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
APPENDIX B: DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
lnTFP: Hall and Jones measure of total factor productivity (in natural logs). Source: Hall and 
Jones (1999) 
 
Ethnic, Language, Religion:  Fractionalization indexes for ethnic, linguistic and religious 
groups. Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
 
Culture: Cultural fractionalization index accounting for cultural distances between groups 
based on language. Source: Fearon (2003) 
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GADP: index of ‘government antidiversion policies’ calculated as the average of five 
International Country Risk Guide measures (1985-1995) law and order, bureaucratic quality, 
corruption, risk of expropriation, government repudiation of contracts, [0-1] range. Source: 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
 
YrsOpen: Sachs and Andrew M. Warner (1995) index of fraction of years open during 1950 
to 1994 period. [0, 1] range. Source: Hall and Jones (1999) 
 
Telephones: Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) in 1988. Source: World Bank (2000). 
 
Popn Density: Population density (people per sq km) in 1988. Source: World Bank (2000). 
 
Radios: Radios (per 1,000 people) 1989. Source: World Bank (2000). 
 
Road Density: Roads/Land Area in 1988 or nearest year. Source: Total roads (kms) in 1988, 
or nearest year, from David Canning (1998); Land Area (in km) from World Bank (2000). 
 
MeanTemp: Mean annual temperature (degrees Celsius) in 1987. Source: John W. McArthur 
and Sachs (2001, Appendix) 
 
LT100km: Proportion of land area within 100km of the sea coast. Source: McArthur and 
Sachs (2001, Appendix) 
 
LandArea: Land area (sq km). Source: World Bank (2000). 
 
EurFrac: Fraction of population speaking a major Western European language: English, 
French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. Source: Hall and Jones (1999) 
 
lnFraRom: Natural log of the Frankel-Romer predicted trade share (computed from a gravity 
model based on population and geography). Source: Hall and Jones (1999) 
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StateHist: Measures the length and and coverage of formal states in current geographical 
borders from 1 to 1950. Source: Statehist5 from Bockstette et al. (2003) 
 
ELF: Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization – Average value of five different indices (range 0 to 
1). Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999, Appendix B).   
 
lnRGDPW60: Real GDP (chain) per worker (1996 international prices) (in natural logs). 
Source: Penn World Tables 6.1 
 
lnKAPW: Real non-residential capital stock per worker (1985 international prices) (in natural 
logs). Source: Penn World Tables 5.6 
 
AYS: Average schooling years in the total population (aged 15 years and over). Source: Barro 
and Lee (2001) 
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TABLE 1 – SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR KEY VARIABLES 
 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
LnTFP 110 7.9570 0.7195 6.2845 9.0154 
Ethnic 110 0.4424 0.2763 0.0000 0.9302 
Language 110 0.3771 0.3028 0.0021 0.9227 
Religion 110 0.4217 0.2500 0.0028 0.8603 
Culture 106 0.2951 0.2156 0.0000 0.7330 
GADP 110 0.6167 0.1958 0.3080 1.0000 
YrsOpen 110 0.3581 0.3453 0.0000 1.0000 
Telephones 110 128.19 176.86 0.6224 663.94 
Popn Density 110 189.00 680.06 1.5527 5683.4 
Radios 110 379.25 344.95 0.2517 2119.3 
Road Density 110 0.5450 0.9323 0.0043 4.7438 
ELF 82 0.3451 0.2975 0.0000 0.8902 
∆AYS 82 2.7558 1.2827 −0.8050 6.5910 
AYS60 82 3.8318 2.4689 0.1160 9.7260 
∆lnKAPW 57 0.8840 0.6248 −0.5495 3.0909 
lnKAPW65 57 8.3797 1.3194 4.6347 10.536 
lnRGDPW60 82 8.8213 0.9268 6.5403 10.376 
N is the number of observations. N = 110 corresponds to the sample used in Table 4, columns 
(1)-(3), N = 106 to Table 4, column (4), N = 82 to Table 2, column (1), and N = 57 to Table 2, 
column (4). 
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TABLE 2 – CHANGES IN CAPITAL STOCKS AND SOCIAL BARRIERS TO 
COMMUNICATION 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable  
∆AYS ∆AYS ∆AYS ∆lnKAPW ∆lnKAPW ∆lnKAPW 
Constant −1.586 
(2.097) 
−1.842 
(1.865) 
0.062 
(2.051) 
1.955 
(0.965) 
0.837 
(0.948) 
2.309 
(0.924) 
Ethnic −1.672 
(0.741) 
  −0.843 
(0.355) 
  
Language 0.160 
(0.654) 
  −0.166 
(0.342) 
  
Religion 0.283 
(0.615) 
  −0.034 
(0.312) 
  
Culture  −1.168 
(0.697) 
  −0.504 
(0.428) 
 
ELF   −1.263 
(0.566) 
  −1.187 
(0.340) 
AYS60 −0.286 
(0.091) 
−0.242 
(0.082) 
−0.204 
(0.082) 
   
lnKAPW60    −0.382 
(0.105) 
−0.374 
(0.114) 
−0.426 
(0.101) 
LnRGDPW60 0.678 
(0.247) 
0.664 
(0.227) 
0.443 
(0.243) 
0.278 
(0.158) 
0.366 
(0.171) 
0.272 
(0.149) 
       
Diagnostics       
R2 0.185 0.168 0.158 0.301 0.198 0.331 
Regression SE 1.208 1.214 1.200 0.547 0.590 0.521 
N 82 79 82 57 54 56 
Normality 0.527 2.279 2.048 3.516 3.014 5.565 
 [p-value] [0.769] [0.320] [0.359] [0.172] [0.222] [0.062] 
White-Hetero 1.043 1.064 1.659 1.520 2.843 2.470 
 [p-value] [0.418] [0.392] [0.143] [0.163] [0.019] [0.036] 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and p-values for diagnostic tests in square brackets. 
Normality is the Doornik-Hansen test of normal errors and White-Hetero is White’s test for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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TABLE 3 – DETERMINANTS OF TFP: OLS RESULTS 
Dependent 
variable: lnTFP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 8.533 
(0.138) 
[0.142] 
7.206 
(0.260) 
[0.300] 
7.237 
(0.213) 
[0.183]
7.297 
(0.273)
[0.243]
7.342 
(0.369) 
[0.423] 
5.905 
(0.300) 
[0.278] 
Ethnic −0.755 
(0.301) 
[0.274] 
0.182 
(0.283) 
[0.290] 
 0.311 
(0.311)
[0.283]
0.148 
(0.335) 
[0.341] 
−0.233 
(0.311) 
[0.339] 
Language −0.567 
(0.278) 
[0.251] 
−0.532 
(0.229) 
[0.211] 
 −0.763 
(0.244)
[0.259]
−0.560 
(0.260) 
[0.231] 
−0.652 
(0.251) 
[0.297] 
Religion −0.087 
(0.254) 
[0.279] 
−0.417 
(0.220) 
[0.223] 
 −0.465 
(0.211)
[0.229]
−0.502 
(0.272) 
[0.281] 
−0.070 
(0.270) 
[0.260] 
Culture   −0.618 
(0.244) 
[0.213]
   
GADP  1.310 
(0.395) 
[0.364] 
0.952 
(0.353) 
[0.280]
1.273 
(0.407)
[0.367]
1.190 
(0.603) 
[0.614] 
2.293 
(0.463) 
[0.432] 
YrsOpen  0.644 
(0.206) 
[0.189] 
0.853 
(0.199) 
[0.180]
0.655 
(0.201)
[0.200]
0.588 
(0.235) 
[0.206] 
0.672 
(0.231) 
[0.225] 
       
Diagnostics       
R2 0.243 0.494 0.470 0.575 0.336 0.722 
Regression SE 0.644 0.531 0.527 0.479 0.578 0.516 
N 118 118 113 108 96 88 
Normality 7.936 2.467 0.037 2.365 1.920 0.679 
 [p-value] [0.019] [0.291] [0.982] [0.307] [0.383] [0.712] 
White-Hetero 1.351 2.739 5.073 3.285 1.714 0.919 
 [p-value] [0.241] [0.005] [0.0001] [0.001] [0.091] [0.521] 
Notes: Conventional standard errors are in parentheses and heteroskedastic-consistent 
standard errors in square brackets.  Normality is the Doornik-Hansen test of normal errors and 
White-Hetero is White’s test for heteroskedasticity.  The sample used in column (4) omits 
influential observations and/or outliers, and in column (5) omits OECD countries.  In column 
(6) the dependent variable is Islam’s (1995) measure of lnTFP. 
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TABLE 4 – DETERMINANTS OF TFP: ROBUSTNESS RESULTS 
Dependent variable: 
lnTFP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 8.079 
(0.502) 
8.072 
(0.118) 
8.292 
(0.152) 
7.706 
(0.107) 
Ethnic 0.122 
(0.305) 
   
Language −1.331 
(0.908) 
−0.755 
(0.219) 
−0.981 
(0.311) 
 
Religion −0.501 
(0.258) 
−0.507 
(0.217) 
−0.705 
(0.328) 
 
Culture    −0.570 
(0.245) 
GADP −0.171 
(0.922) 
   
YrsOpen 0.206 
(0.393) 
  0.722 
(0.203) 
Telephones 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.0004)
0.001 
(0.0006)
0.001 
(0.0004) 
Popn Density 0.00001 
(0.00003) 
   
Radios −0.0001 
(0.0005) 
   
Road Density 0.017 
(0.117) 
   
Language*Telephones −0.002 
(0.003) 
   
Language*Radios 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.0006)
0.002 
(0.0007)
 
Language*Popn 0.0003 
(0.001) 
   
Language*Road -0.025 
(0.407) 
   
Language*GADP 1.032 
(1.859) 
   
Language*YrsOpen 0.103 
(0.887) 
   
     
Diagnostics     
R2 0.533 0.509 0.490 0.464 
Regression SE 0.530 0.514 0.528 0.524 
N 110 110 110 106 
Normality 3.273 3.867  0.067 
 [p-value] [0.195] [0.145]  [0.967] 
White-Hetero 1.524 1.412  1.639 
 [p-value] [0.071] [0.114]  [0.049] 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses and p-values for diagnostic tests 
in square brackets.  Results in columns (1), (2) and (4) are obtained using OLS. 
Results in column (3) are median regression estimates.  
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TABLE 5 – DETERMINANTS OF TFP: IV RESULTS 
Dependent 
variable: lnTFP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 7.735 
(0.529) 
7.798 
(0.501) 
8.228 
(0.132) 
8.003 
(0.203) 
8.308 
(0.127) 
Ethnic −0.001 
(0.373) 
    
Language −0.540 
(0.268) 
 −1.056 
(0.272) 
−0.838 
(0.267) 
−1.142 
(0.219) 
Religion −0.299 
(0.333) 
 −0.558 
(0.237) 
−0.525 
(0.268) 
−0.750 
(0.246) 
Culture  −0.800 
(0.326) 
   
GADP 0.112 
(1.136) 
−0.468 
(1.078) 
   
YrsOpen 1.479 
(0.657) 
1.999 
(0.687) 
 0.871 
(0.458) 
 
Telephones   0.001 
(0.0006) 
  
Road Density    0.147 
(0.158) 
0.362 
(0.113) 
Language*Radios   0.002 
(0.0009) 
0.002 
(0.0009)
0.003 
(0.0007) 
      
Diagnostics      
R2 0.476 0.376 0.523 0.536 0.511 
Regression SE 0.544 0.610 0.506 0.499 0.510 
N 91 91 99 88 88 
Sargan χ2 
[p-value] 
1.887 
[0.596] 
2.216 
[0.529] 
5.374 
[0.146] 
2.556 
[0.923] 
6.084 
[0.638] 
Hausman χ2 
[p-value] 
3.386 
[0.184] 
5.819 
[0.055] 
1.990 
[0.370] 
6.849 
[0.077] 
6.612 
[0.037] 
R2 for first-stage regressions 
GADP 0.741 0.667    
YrsOpen 0.512 0.522  0.571 
Telephones   0.703   
Road Density    0.475 
Language*Radios   0.663 0.730 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are given in parentheses and p-values in square brackets.  
R2 for IV regressions is calculated as the squared correlation- between the observed and 
predicted values of the dependent variable.  Sargan χ2 is Sargan’s misspecification test for IV 
estimation and Hausman χ2 is a test for the consistency of the corresponding OLS estimates.   
Instrument sets: Column (1): Ethnic, Language, Religion, MeanTemp, LT100km, StatHist, 
EurFrac, lnFraRom; Column (2): Culture, MeanTemp, LT100km, StatHist, EurFrac, 
lnFraRom; Column (3): Language, Religion, Meantemp, LT100km and the interaction of 
MeanTemp, LT100km and LandArea with Language; Columns (4) and (5): Ethnic, Language, 
Religion, StatHist, EurFrac, lnFraRom, MeanTemp, LT100km, LandArea and the interaction 
of each of the last three variables with language. 
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1 Hall and Jones note that their estimates are very similar to those obtained in Hall and Jones (1996) 
where “…the production function is not restricted to Cobb-Douglas, and factor shares are allowed to 
vary across countries” (Hall and Jones 1999, p. 93). 
2 Given the way the components are measured, high values of GADP are conducive to supporting 
production. 
3 The cut off values used were 2 for the studentized residuals and 2k/N for the leverage statistics 
(David A. Belsley, Edwin Kuh and Roy E. Welsch, 1980). 
4 The diagnostic tests implemented in the search algorithm were the Normality and White-Hetero tests, 
discussed above, plus F-tests for parameter constancy for breakpoints at the sample mid-point and 90th 
percentile.  For the diagnostic tests, a 1-percent significance level was used throughout to help control 
the overall null-rejection probability, as suggested by the Monte Carlo evidence in Krolzig and Hendry 
(2001). 
5 A complete listing of the PcGets algorithm is available in Hendry and Krolzig (2001, Appendix A1) 
or Krolzig and Hendry (2001, Tables 1 and 2). 
6 In this context, power and size relate to the probabilities of retaining in the final model variables that 
are, respectively, included and not included in the DGP. 
7 Use of a general-to-specific modelling approach also helps address the issue of model uncertainty 
(William A. Brock and Steven N. Durlauf, 2001; Durlauf, 2002). 
8 Excluding the constant, only the coefficient on Religion is statistically significant at the 10-percent 
level (on a two-tailed test), with the coefficients on Language and Telephones significant at the 15-
pecent level. 
9 This index rates the territory of the current geographical boundaries of a country in terms of whether 
the government is above tribal level, is colonial or locally based, and the territorial coverage of the 
government for 50 year sub-periods from 0 to 1950. A single observation for each country is obtained 
by discounting the effect of past values.  We use Bockstette et al’s preferred measure corresponding to 
a discount rate of 5 percent. 
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